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Early recognition and rapid initiation of infection control
precautions are currently the most important strategies for
controlling severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). No
rapid diagnostic tests currently exist that can rule out SARS
among patients with febrile respiratory illnesses. Clinical
features alone cannot with certainty distinguish SARS from
other respiratory illnesses rapidly enough to inform early
management decisions. A balanced approach to screening
that allows early recognition of SARS without unnecessary
isolation of patients with other respiratory illnesses will
require clinicians not only to look for suggestive clinical fea-
tures but also to routinely seek epidemiologic clues sug-
gestive of SARS coronavirus exposure. Key epidemiologic
risk factors include 1) exposure to settings where SARS
activity is suspected or documented, or 2) in the absence
of such exposure, epidemiologic linkage to other persons
with pneumonia (i.e., pneumonia clusters), or 3) exposure
to healthcare settings. When combined with clinical find-
ings, these epidemiologic features provide a possible
strategic framework for early recognition of SARS. 
I
n November 2002, clusters of a highly transmissible and
severe atypical pneumonia began appearing among resi-
dents of the Guangdong Province of China. These patients
are now believed to have been the first persons with severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a previously unde-
scribed respiratory illness now known to be caused by a
novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (1–4). These original
clusters marked the beginning of an outbreak that spread
rapidly around the globe, resulting in 8,098 reported cases
from 32 countries and a case-fatality rate of 9.6% (5). On
July 5, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO)
announced that all known person-to-person transmission
of SARS-CoV had ceased (6). The cause for the decline in
cases is not yet fully understood, but SARS-CoV may still
possibly exist within either an animal or a human reservoir
and cause future outbreaks (4). Clinicians and public
health agencies must be prepared for the possible reappear-
ance of SARS.
Although many unanswered questions remain regard-
ing the epidemiology of SARS, simple infection control
measures can dramatically reduce transmission of SARS-
CoV (7–10). In every region in which major outbreaks
were reported, a substantial proportion of cases resulted
from delays in clinical recognition and isolation of SARS
patients after they were admitted into the healthcare sys-
tem (8,9,11–13). Studies of transmission in Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Ontario, Canada, suggest that early case
detection will be a critical component in controlling future
outbreaks of SARS (10,14–16). 
Currently, no rapid diagnostic tests are widely available
to rule out SARS. Because the early clinical features can
be similar to those of other bacterial and viral infections,
rapid recognition of SARS patients is likely to be particu-
larly challenging in the context of seasonal outbreaks of
other respiratory illnesses. The need for distinguishing
patients with SARS from those with more common and
benign illnesses presents clinicians with a diagnostic
dilemma; screening methods that are not sufficiently sen-
sitive may result in delays in recognition and uncontrolled
transmission of SARS, while nonspecific screening meth-
ods could result in unnecessary isolation of large numbers
of persons, rapidly overburdening the already limited
resources of both the healthcare and public health systems. 
Abalanced approach to early recognition of SARS will
require clinicians to look not only for suggestive clinical
features but also for epidemiologic clues that suggest
SARS-CoV infection. We provide a possible framework
that combines epidemiologic features and clinical findings
to formulate strategies for early recognition of SARS. 
Clinical Description of SARS
Clinical Signs and Symptoms
The median incubation period for SARS appears to be
approximately 4–6 days; most patients become ill within 2
to 10 days after exposure (8,12,17,18). Some evidence
suggests that the incubation period may be as long as 14
days in some persons (17). 
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rigor (1,11,17–22). In some patients, headache, myalgia,
and malaise precede the onset of fever by up to 1 day, and
fever may have resolved by the time respiratory symptoms
appear (1,18,19,22). Respiratory symptoms typically do
not begin until 2–7 days after illness onset, although they
are among the initial symptoms in up to 30% of patients
(1,18–20). The most common respiratory complaints are
lower respiratory tract symptoms, including nonproductive
cough and dyspnea; productive cough is reported in up to
25% of patients (1,11,17–22). In some series, <10% of
patients reported upper respiratory complaints (18,20,23),
but in others the reported prevalence of rhinorrhea or sore
throat is as high as 25% among patients with SARS
(11,17,19). The prevalence of gastrointestinal symptoms
has varied by report, but nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, or a
combination of these symptoms has been reported in up to
25% of patients with SARS at the time of initial evaluation
(1,11,17–22,24). In one series, diarrhea developed in 73%
of patients at some point in the course of illness (22). Fever
and diarrhea have been the dominant initial symptoms in
some patients (13). Asymptomatic infection with SARS-
CoV appears to be uncommon (25,26). 
Elderly patients and those with underlying chronic ill-
nesses such as renal failure may not have typical symp-
toms of SARS (12,13,27). For patients in this group who
have strong epidemiologic risk factors for SARS, the diag-
nosis should be considered in almost any change in health
status, even if the patients do not exhibit typical clinical
features. 
Physical Findings
Tachypnea, tachycardia, and hypoxemia have been
reported in 40% to 75% of patients upon admission to the
hospital (1,18–20) but may be less common in patients
who are evaluated earlier in the course of illness as outpa-
tients (21). Upon auscultation of the lungs, rales or rhonchi
have been detectable in most patients in some series, and
less commonly in others (18,20,21,28). Some researchers
have observed a lack of lung sounds despite marked infil-
tration on chest radiography (21,28). As many as
15%–44% of patients may have a normal measured body
temperature when first evaluated (18,19).
Laboratory Findings
Hematologic abnormalities are among the most consis-
tent laboratory findings reported in patients with SARS;
most patients have total leukocyte counts that are normal
or slightly low, and 70%–95% of patients have lymphope-
nia (11,18–20,22,29). Platelet counts are mildly depressed
in 30% to 50% of patients (11,19,22,29). Prolongation of
the activated partial thromboplastin time can be observed
in 40% to 60% of patients, but disseminated intravascular
coagulation is uncommon (11,29). 
Other common abnormal laboratory findings include
elevated lactate dehydrogenase levels in 70% to 90% of
patients (11,18,19), elevated alanine aminotransferase or
aspartate aminotransferase levels in 20% to 30% (11,22),
elevated creatine phosphokinase in 30% to 40%
(11,22,30), and elevated C-reactive protein (1,31).
Radiographic Findings
While the full understanding of the spectrum of radi-
ographic manifestations of SARS will require additional
information, available data suggest that almost all reported
patients with laboratory evidence of SARS-CoV infection
have radiographic evidence of pneumonia documented at
some point during their illness (19,21,31). Chest radi-
ographs may be normal in up to 30% of patients with the
clinical diagnosis of SARS at the time when first evaluat-
ed (18,22,32–34). In reports from China, radiographic
changes consistent with pneumonia were detected in 67%
to 80% of SARS patients by day 3 of illness, 97%–100%
by day 7, and in 100% by day 10 (33,34). Alesion typical-
ly begins as an isolated focal lesion found in a peripheral
location, often in the lower lobes. In 75% of patients, the
lesions progress over several days to involve additional
lobes or both lungs (32,34).
Computed tomography (CT) of the chest appears to be
more sensitive than conventional chest radiography for
detecting pneumonia; SARS patients who have normal
chest radiographic findings early in their clinical course
often have evidence of pneumonia by CT (11,35).
Common CT findings are ground-glass opacification and a
lower lobe and peripheral distribution (35).
Distinguishing SARS from Other Illnesses 
As with other causes of bacterial and viral pneumonia,
clinical findings in patients with SARS cannot accurately
predict the causative agent. Further study is required to
determine whether a constellation of clinical findings
alone can be used to discriminate accurately between
SARS and other (especially viral) respiratory illnesses.
Many of the clinical and laboratory features of SARS are
similar to those in other forms of viral pneumonia (28,36).
Several clinical features, however, may be helpful in facil-
itating recognition of patients with SARS (Table 1). 
Laboratory Tests for SARS-CoV
The main laboratory tests available to diagnose SARS-
CoV infection are RNA detection through reverse tran-
scriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) or real-time
PCR and serologic testing for antibodies against SARS-
CoV (1,2,22). None of these tests can be used reliably to
detect the presence or absence of SARS-CoV infection at
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are insufficiently sensitive to reliably diagnose all persons
with SARS when first evaluated; in one study, SARS-CoV
was initially detected in nasopharyngeal samples by RT-
PCR in 32% of patients and in 68% at day 14 after illness
onset (22). PCR tests also can provide false-positive test
results even in the most experienced laboratories, so their
indiscriminant use for persons at low risk for SARS infec-
tion could result in a false diagnosis of SARS and unnec-
essarily initiating isolation and quarantine measures.
Although antibodies can be detected in serologic assays
starting at 10 to 14 days after illness onset (2,22), serolog-
ic tests cannot reliably rule out SARS-CoV infections until
28 days after onset of symptoms, when sensitivity is at
least 93% (22). 
While respiratory samples have been the most com-
monly used samples for virus detection, virus may be more
readily detectable in serum earlier in the course of illness
and in stool samples later in the course of illness (1,22)
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC],
unpub. data). More research is needed to determine the
optimal timing of sample collection, the duration of shed-
ding, and the optimal type of sample. 
Epidemiologic Features Important 
for Early Recognition of SARS
Given that no specific clinical or laboratory findings can
with certainty distinguish SARS from other respiratory ill-
nesses rapidly enough to inform early management deci-
sions, epidemiologic features are critical to early recogni-
tion of SARS. Epidemiologic features that may be helpful
in early recognition include a history of exposure to known
SARS case-patients or SARS-affected areas, an epidemio-
logic linkage to a cluster of pneumonia cases, a history of
travel to previously SARS-affected areas, and employment
as a healthcare worker with direct patient care. 
Epidemiologic Linkage to Cases or 
SARS-affected Areas 
The predominant mode of transmission of SARS-CoV
appears to be through large respiratory droplets or direct
contact (7,8). This mode of transmission is consistent with
the observation that most patients can be linked, either
directly or indirectly, to persons with SARS or places
where transmission is either suspected or documented
(17,37). In the Toronto and Singapore outbreaks, >94% of
case-patients had documented contact with a SARS patient
or with a hospital ward where there was a known SARS
patient (8,38). Therefore, determining if persons with
symptoms compatible with SARS have an epidemiologic
linkage either to other persons with known or suspected
SARS or to places with known or suspected transmission
of SARS-CoV is important. 
Whether a history of travel to areas previously affected
by SARS will be a useful epidemiologic clue for recogniz-
ing future outbreaks depends in part on whether SARS-
CoV currently exists within a human or an animal reser-
voir. If the virus exists within a human reservoir, the virus
could reemerge anywhere on the globe, although the areas
of highest activity during the recent outbreaks are most
likely to harbor persistent infection in humans.
Alternatively, if SARS-CoV currently exists primarily
within the animal reservoir from which it originated, future
outbreaks may more likely originate in Southeast Asia.
Given that China appears to have been the origin of the
most recent outbreak (4,39) and neighboring areas are at
greatest risk, persons traveling in Southeast Asia, especial-
ly in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, may be at increased
risk for infection if SARS recurs. 
Case Clustering
The major limitation of relying on linkage to settings of
known transmission to identify persons at risk for SARS is
identifying the first cases acquired in an area not previous-
ly known to have circulation of SARS-CoV. Because
SARS-CoV infections tend to appear in clusters, one
potential strategy for early recognition in such areas is to
seek evidence for clustering of pneumonia cases. Early
recognition of clusters requires clinicians evaluating
patients with pneumonia to routinely seek a history of
exposure to others with pneumonia.
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Table 1.Common clinical features of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS)  
Clinical feature 
Common findings with SARS-associated 
coronavirus infection 
Initial symptoms  Nonrespiratory prodrome lasting 2–7 days 







Respiratory phase beginning 2–7 days after 
onset characterized by: 
Nonproductive cough 
Dyspnea 
Absence of upper respiratory symptoms 
Normal or low total leukocyte cell count  Laboratory 
Findings  Lymphopenia 
  Mildly depressed platelet count 
  Elevated lactate dehydrogenase levels 
  Elevated creatine phosphokinase levels 
  Elevated transaminase levels 
  Prolonged activated partial thromboplastin time 
Radiographic 
Findings 
Abnormal chest x-ray results in almost all 
patients by the second week of illness  Healthcare Association 
Healthcare facilities have played a central role in the
epidemiology of SARS. Persons who work in healthcare
settings were among the earliest and most severely affect-
ed group in almost every major outbreak reported, particu-
larly during the earliest phases of the outbreak (8,11,13).
For example, in the Toronto and Singapore outbreaks, 43%
and 41%, respectively, of the SARS cases occurred in
healthcare workers (40). Therefore, atypical pneumonia
among healthcare workers should raise the suspicion for
SARS, particularly if there are multiple cases among
healthcare workers in the same facility. 
Combining Clinical and Epidemiologic Features 
Since patients may transmit the virus early in the clini-
cal course (8), the goal of diagnostic strategies should be
to detect patients with SARS as early in the illness as pos-
sible to prevent potential transmission. A practical
approach to evaluating patients with fever or respiratory
symptoms is needed, which requires an assessment of the
strength of the evidence of exposure to other SARS-
CoV–infected persons. This assessment is directly related
to the level of documented SARS activity in the surround-
ing community and the world. 
Evaluating Patients in the Absence 
of Documented SARS Activity Anywhere 
in the World
In the absence of any documented SARS transmission
worldwide, the overall likelihood that a given patient has
SARS-CoV infection will be exceedingly low unless there
are both typical clinical findings and some accompanying
epidemiologic evidence for SARS-CoV infection.
Therefore, one approach would be to consider the diagno-
sis only among patients with both 1) unexplained severe
pneumonia and 2) epidemiologic evidence that could sug-
gest SARS, including a link to a cluster of cases of unex-
plained pneumonia, a history of recent travel (or close con-
tact to an ill traveler) to a previously SARS-affected area,
or employment as a healthcare worker with direct patient
care responsibilities (Table 2). For persons who are health-
care workers or who have traveled to previously SARS-
affected areas, evidence of clustered pneumonia cases
would further increase the index of suspicion. In addition,
atypical pneumonia in a person who works in a laboratory
that contains live SARS-CoV should raise the possibility
of SARS.
In the absence of pneumonia, history of travel to a pre-
viously SARS-affected area is likely to have an extremely
low positive predictive value for detecting SARS among
patients with respiratory illness and, if used as a screening
tool, would likely result in an unacceptable burden on the
public health system. (U.S. travelers alone make almost 5
million trips to Asia every year, and respiratory symptoms
are common among returning travelers [41,42].)
Clinicians practicing within previously SARS-affected
areas may have to adopt a different approach to detecting
SARS among patients with pneumonia, such as requiring
both evidence of clustering and a typical combination of
laboratory and radiologic findings. Clinical algorithms that
use more stringent criteria are being developed and will
require further validation (31,43). 
Evaluating Patients after Documentation 
of SARS Anywhere in the World 
Once SARS activity has been documented anywhere in
the world, the positive predictive value of even early clin-
ical symptoms, while still low (21), is more acceptable if
used in combination with an epidemiologic link to settings
in which SARS has been documented. Therefore, in addi-
tion to evaluating all patients with unexplained pneumonia
as described above, all patients with fever or respiratory
symptoms should be screened for a history of exposure to
persons with SARS, travel to areas where SARS transmis-
sion is suspected, or contact with ill persons with such a
travel history. 
In a community where transmission of SARS-CoV is
widespread and many cases have no identifiable link to
well-defined epidemiologic settings, a provisional diagno-
sis should be considered for any patient with fever or res-
piratory illness. The relationship between the clinical his-
tory, exposure history, and level of SARS activity in the
surrounding community are summarized in Table 2. 
The diagnosis of nosocomial SARS among patients
hospitalized in either acute or long-term-care facilities
may be particularly challenging, since many inpatients
may have other reasons for having fever, respiratory symp-
toms, or pneumonia, and persons with other underlying ill-
nesses may not have typical symptoms. Unrecognized
nosocomial SARS was an important factor in spread of
disease in the recent outbreaks described in Toronto,
Singapore, and Taiwan (12,13,44). Therefore, clinicians
and public health professionals must stay particularly vig-
ilant about evaluating fever and respiratory illnesses
among inpatients if there have been recent SARS infec-
tions in the same facility (44).
Management Decisions after 
Provisional Diagnosis 
If a provisional diagnosis of SARS is made on the basis
of the clinical and epidemiologic factors discussed, the
patient should be managed according to existing guidance
for SARS isolation precautions while evaluation and treat-
ment proceed (45). The clinical evaluation should include,
in addition to testing for SARS-CoV, laboratory testing for
alternative diagnoses that could explain the illness. The
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communicability or until convincing evidence against
SARS is documented. Although the duration of communi-
cability is not known, in the recent outbreak the isolation
of patients until 10 days after their fever was gone and
their respiratory symptoms were improving seemed an
effective method to prevent additional transmission
(45,46). 
Alternative Diagnoses 
Documenting the presence of other diseases does not
exclude the possibility of SARS because patients with
SARS-CoV infection can be co-infected with other respi-
ratory pathogens (19,47). If the presence of an alternative
diagnosis is to be used as justification for discontinuing
SARS-specific isolation precautions, the alternative diag-
noses should be based only upon tests with high positive
predictive value, and the clinical illness should be fully
explainable by the diagnosis. The possibility of secondary
infection should be considered if the diagnosis of bacterial
pneumonia is confirmed, since bacterial pneumonia is a
well-known complication of viral respiratory tract infec-
tion and may occur following SARS-CoV infection. 
Particular care should be taken in completely attribut-
ing the illness to an alternative diagnosis if the epidemio-
logic link to others known to have SARS-CoV infection is
strong, or if the patient is part of an epidemiologic cluster
of similar illnesses. In the latter instance, confirming an
alternative diagnosis among more than one person within
the cluster may be used as evidence against SARS, partic-
ularly if the clinical findings are not typical of SARS (e.g.,
upper respiratory symptoms). 
Ruling out SARS
The only currently available laboratory method for
excluding the diagnosis of SARS-CoV infection is to
obtain a negative result on serologic testing of a convales-
cent-phase serum sample obtained >28 days after onset of
symptoms. For patients without evidence of pneumonia at
the initial evaluation, serial observations over time may be
helpful in identifying those in whom isolation precautions
can be safely discontinued (21). Resolution of symptoms
and lack of development of radiographic evidence of pneu-
monia by the 2nd week of illness argue against the diagno-
sis of SARS. Some patients with mild illness may be
missed when this approach is used, but if that is the case,
they likely will not play an epidemiologically important
role in transmission. 
Patients with documented pneumonia who have been
given the provisional diagnosis of SARS should be treated
as if they have SARS-CoV infection, unless there is con-
vincing evidence for an alternative diagnosis or new epi-
demiologic information excludes the possibility that the
patient was exposed to SARS 
Importance of Communication 
Because early recognition of SARS depends upon iden-
tifying the epidemiologic linkage to SARS-affected per-
sons or places, clinicians must remain updated with current
information regarding the locations of SARS activity in




  Clinical features  Epidemiologic features 
  Patients with severe pneumonia of 
unknown cause 
Recent exposure to other persons with unexplained pneumonia  
 
  Recent travel to previously SARS-affected area or close contact 
with ill persons with a history of travel to such areas
b 
  Healthcare worker
c 
documented  All patients with fever, especially 
accompanied by headache, myalgias, rigor 
Close contact with a person with known or suspected SARS 
Any patient with lower respiratory tract 
symptoms 
Exposure to any place in which active transmission of SARS is 
documented or suspected 
Patients with severe pneumonia of 
unknown cause 
Close contact with a person with known or suspected SARS 
  Exposure to any place in which active transmission of SARS is 
documented or suspected 
  If none of the above: 
  Recent exposure to other persons with unexplained pneumonia 
  Recent travel to previously SARS-affected area or close contact 
with ill persons with a history of travel to such areas 
  Healthcare worker 
The possibility of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) should be considered for any patient with both the clinical and epidemiologic features described, depending 
-associated coronavirus infection should be 
rs, or exposure to persons with pneumonia while traveling in a previously SARS-affected area. 
Previously SARS-affected areas include areas in Southeast Asia in which SARS may originate and neighboring areas that may be at risk for early spread because of 
 
Healthcare worker defined as one who has direct patient-care responsibilities. In addition, atypical pneumonia in a person who works in a laboratory that contains live 
-CoV should raise the possibility of SARS. order to obtain the appropriate history from the patients
with fever or respiratory illness. Mechanisms for rapid
communication between clinicians and public health agen-
cies must be in place so that physicians can be updated fre-
quently as outbreaks evolve both locally and globally.
Such lines of communication will also be important in
helping public health agencies more rapidly identify
emerging areas of activity (such as clusters of illness)
through clinician reports of patients with risk factors for
SARS. 
Similarly, communication among health authorities in
different jurisdictions in a region and among countries
around the world will be essential to assess risk for expo-
sure for travelers returning from those areas. Information
on SARS can be obtained from CDC and WHO Web sites,
among others (available from: URL: http://www.cdc.gov
and URL: http://www.who.int).
Conclusions
The framework that we have discussed for the early
recognition of patients with SARS is based upon the
knowledge and experience gathered during the recent
worldwide outbreak, which suggests that clinical features
alone cannot be used to conclusively distinguish SARS
from other respiratory illnesses rapidly enough to inform
early management decisions in a practical manner. Clinical
features must be interpreted in the context of key epidemi-
ologic risk factors, including epidemiologic linkage to
other persons with pneumonia (i.e., clusters of cases of
pneumonia clinically compatible with SARS), exposure to
settings in which SARS activity is suspected or document-
ed, and pneumonia among healthcare workers with direct
patient care. Surveillance and additional research will be
critical to help refine the epidemiologic, clinical, and lab-
oratory features used to identify future infections with
SARS, which will in turn help with the early detection and
prevention of transmission of SARS-CoV infections. 
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